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I. INTRODUCTION
The Soviet Union inaugurated the Space Age in 1957 with the launch
of the first artificial satellite, Sputnik I, into the Earth's orbit. Human
activity in space, once only a dream, had become reality. The hope for
human advancement was immense. However, over the past five decades,
the progress of the Space Age has not matched the measure of that hope.'
National space agencies have slowly and inefficiently explored and
developed the space frontier. But, the success of a recent private
competition suggests a better channel for facilitating space exploration and
development: private commercial enterprise.
In 1996, the X PRIZE Foundation teamed up with the Ansari family to
2sponsor a private prize competition. The Ansari X PRIZE awarded $10
million to the first team to "build and launch a spacecraft capable of
carrying three people to 100 kilometers above the earth's surface, twice
J.D. Candidate, 2010, Northwestern University School of Law.
See Note, Commercialization of Space: Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of
2004, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 619, 631 (2004) ("When Sputnik I first achieved orbit in 1957,
the space age began. Now, nearly half a century later, concerns are growing that mankind
has failed to realize the potential ushered in by this age.").
2 See X PRIZE Foundation Home Page, Ansari X PRIZE, http://space.xprize.org/ansari-
x-prize (last visited Nov. 1, 2009). The competition "was modeled after the Orteig Prize,
won by Charles Lindbergh in 1927 for being the first to fly non-stop from New York to
Paris." Id. The team leader for the eventual winner, Burt Rutan, thought the Ansari X
PRIZE could signal the beginning of an innovative period for the aerospace industry like that
experienced by the airplane industry a century ago. See X PRIZE Foundation Home Page,
Scaled Composites, http://space.xprize.org/ansari-x-prize/scaled-composites (last visited
Nov. 1, 2009) ("I strongly feel that, if we are successful, our program will mark the
beginning of a renaissance for manned space flight. This might even be similar to that
wonderful time period between 1908 and 1912 when the world went from a total of ten
airplane pilots to hundreds of airplane types and thousands of pilots in 39 countries.").
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within two weeks." 3  Twenty-six teams from seven different countries
competed for the Ansari X PRIZE, spending more than $100 million
combined.4  On October 4, 2004, the 47th anniversary of the launch of
Sputnik I, a team named Scaled Composites, led by aerospace designer Burt
Rutan and financier Paul Allen, won the competition with their spacecraft,
SpaceShipOne.' The accomplishment of this feat was even more
impressive because of its relatively cheap price tag: the total financinprequired to develop the SpaceShipOne technology was a mere $20 million.
NASA has sent limited numbers of astronauts into space over the last
five decades, including landing a dozen astronauts on the Moon.7 Other
national space agencies have or are poised to develop the ability to send
astronauts into space.8  However, private commercial space enterprise
promises to be a more powerful catalyst to the full development of the
Space Age. Consider that NASA is due to retire its space shuttle fleet in
2010, leaving the national space agency without the ability to transport
supplies or a crew to the International Space Station ("ISS").9 To cover this
gap, NASA will temporarily rely on the Russian Space Agency's Soyuz
rockets to fulfill its ISS commitments.10 In addition, NASA has awarded
commercial contracts to Space Exploration Technologies Corporation and
Orbital Sciences Corporation ("SpaceX") for the development of a
domestic, commercial alternative to reliance on the Russians." SpaceX has
been rapidly developing a new space vehicle capable of reaching high orbit,
docking with the ISS, and transporting supplies and crew at a more
reasonable cost and within a more concrete schedule than NASA's own
proposed new space transportation architecture.12  Through the
X PRIZE Foundation Home Page, Ansari X PRIZE, supra note 2.
5 See id. SpaceShipOne was the vehicle that actually entered space and returned to Earth
afterwards; the design used a twin turbojet named White Knight for the first stage of launch
before the hybrid rocket, SpaceShipOne, executed the second stage of launch. See X PRIZE
Foundation Home Page, Scaled Composites, supra note 2.
6 See Alan Boyle, SpaceShipOne Wins $10 Million X Prize, MSNBC.coM, Oct. 5, 2004,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6167761/.
See NASA, What Does NASA Do?,
http://www.nasa.gov/about/highlights/whatdoes-nasa do.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2009).
See China Claims Its Place in Space, CNN.coM, Oct. 15, 2003,
http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/space/10/14/china.launch/index.html (reporting that China
became the third nation to send a person into space in 2003); David Barboza, Chinese
Launch 3 Men Toward Orbit; Country Attempting Its First Space Walk, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Sept. 26, 2008, at 3 ("India and Japan are aggressively developing their own space
programs. . .. ").
9 John Schwartz, With U.S. Help, Private Space Companies Press Their Case: Why Not
Us?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2008, at D4.
10 Id
" Patrick Peterson, Low Costs, High Hopes, FLA. TODAY, Jan. 8, 2009, at 8C.




accomplishments of SpaceShipOne and SpaceX, private commercial space
enterprise has made a case for itself as the best-suited candidate for
pioneering the space frontier.
However, certain problems are holding private commercial space
enterprise back, including the current structure of space law, which leaves
too much uncertainty for a private commercial space enterprise, in
particular regarding property rights and profitability. Some commentators
have suggested reforms to space law to remove that uncertainty, but most of
these suggestions bend, dismiss, or call for wholesale abandonment of
clearly applicable international law. This comment suggests a seed of a
very different sort of reform that works within the confines of established
international law: the international community could organize a space
district tailored to encourage private commercial space enterprise, but
exclusively regulated by international authority and consensus.
Part II of this comment addresses why exploration and development of
outer space should occur and why private commercial space enterprise is
the best suited channel for exploring and developing outer space. Part III
describes the structure of international space law as it is relevant to private
commercial space enterprise. Part IV discusses what the structure of
international space law means for private commercial space enterprises and
what private firms require from space law to be able to adequately
participate in space enterprises. Part V presents other commentators'
suggested reforms to the structure of space law to encourage the
participation of private commercial space enterprise in exploring and
developing outer space but generally rejects them for being notable
departures from or rejections of established international law. Part VI
offers a suggestion for developing space law that is consistent with
established international law: the design and creation of a space district, to
be administered to encourage the participation of private commercial
enterprise in outer space but with due regard for the sensitivities of the
international community. Part VII briefly concludes this comment.
II. EXPLORATION AND COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF OUTER
SPACE
A. Why Explore and Develop: Advancement, Profit, and Benefit
There are many reasons to explore and develop space, including that to
do so is a challenge sure to bring out both creativity and dedication in its
pioneers. Beyond adventure and futurism, other concrete and more
immediate reasons exist: scientific and industrial advancement, commercial
profit, and social benefit.
completely abandoning NASA's "new space transportation architecture." It has yet to be
seen if Congress will approve that measure.
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The vacuum of space, the absence or reduction of gravity, and the
extremes in temperature provide an ideal environment for the material
processing necessary in many manufacturing industries, including
metallurgy, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, genetic engineering, and
molecular electronics.13 The vacuum that exists in space permits enhanced
or perfect crystallization of certain substances.14 Therefore, in space, the
production of these substances can be accomplished much more efficiently
than on Earth-seven hundred times more efficiently and four times more
purely." These conditions make possible substantial scientific advances in
the areas of medicine' 6 and pharmacology, 7 and industrial advances in
electronics," glass,' 9 and metallurgy.2 0
Commercial profit is sure to attach to the above scientific and
industrial advances as well. Cheaper drugs, electronic components, and
building materials mean higher profits for those companies willing to invest
in space. Furthermore, the construction of a space infrastructure would
stimulate all levels of the economy.2' In fact, space exploration and
development has already birthed a multi-billion dollar industry.2 2 Last
decade's telecommunications boom spurred the initial development of a
commercial space infrastructure: the building, launching, and maintaining
13 Ty S. Twibell, Note, Space Law: Legal Restraints on Commercialization and
Development of Outer Space, 65 UMKC L. REv. 589, 626-27 (1997).
I4 Id.
'5 Id. at 627.
16 The space industry has already generated spin-off innovations and technology,
including "a new method for breast cancer detection . . . [and] the accelerated development
of hospital monitoring devices and similar paramedic tools, heart pacemakers, and artificial
skin." Id. Also, the space environment is especially conducive to the treatment of and
rehabilitation from certain conditions. Microgravity could prevent bed sores and help
chronic diseases affecting the nervous, cardiovascular, and respiratory systems. Further, the
absence of gravity would all but eliminate gravity-dependent conditions like pneumonia and
certain pulmonary conditions. Id. at 628-30.
1 Medicines prepared in space are purer; this is particularly useful when preparing non-
allergenic medicines and effective antibiotics, vitamins, serums and vaccines. Id. at 628.
8 Space allows greater purity and uniformity of crystallization and allows for the better
production of ceramic oxide (used in computer memories, optical communications,
optoelectronics, and ultrasonics) and gallium arsenide (used for turning on computers). Id at
630.
19 Glass produced in space "would be ultrapure." Id.
20 Metals could be produced super hard, and at only half the weight of current metals. Id.
21 So far, despite the current economic environment's lull and the talk of a need to
"stimulate" the economy, the new administration of President Obama has said precious little
on the economic potential of stimulating the space industry.
22 See Twibell, supra note 13, at 591, 620. This space industry is not necessarily led by
the United States, either. In fact, since the United States retired its Expendable Rocket
Launch Fleet, the European Space Agency has captured the majority of commercial launch
contracts with Arianespace's Ariane rocket. Id. at 621-22. Even previously third-world




of communications satellites.23  And now the infrastructure is rapidly
evolving to accommodate the newest visitors to space: tourists.2 4 "More
space activity" translates into "more necessary infrastructure" and "more
economic stimulus."
The potential for future commercial profit from developing space
infrastructure will also depend on another imminent space activity-space
mining. The minable resources located on the Moon and in near-Earth
asteroids are both immense and valuable.25 These extra-terrestrial resources
are probably necessary to build a comprehensive space infrastructure: it
simply costs too much to blast industrial materials in mass out of Earth's
26gravity.
Outer space need not be all about dollars and cents though. Great
social benefit also attaches to the exploration and development of outer
space. Notably, outer space may provide solutions to energy and hazardous
waste problems here on Earth. As finite energy sources are slowly depleted
here on Earth, it is extremely relevant that bountiful supplies of energy exist
in outer space. Solar energy is in almost infinite supply, 2 7 significant
hydrocarbon deposits exist nearby, 28 and the fuel for ultra-clean fusion
orbits the Earth.29  Outer space also provides a possible answer for the
problem of accumulating hazardous waste on Earth-simply eject it into the
far recesses of space.30 Importantly, both of the above resolutions to the
23 Id. at 622-24.
24 See infra Part II.B.
25 See John S. Lewis & Christopher F. Lewis, A Proposed International Legal Regime for
the Era of Private Commercial Utilization of Space, 37 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 745, 746
(2005) (arguing that the most lucrative motive for entering space is "the mining and
utilization of near-Earth space resources that exist on the Moon and near-Earth asteroids
(NEAs)").
26 See Twibell, supra note 13, at 633 ("Mining is the only feasible way to construct any
space station, space ship, or other similar facility of any significant size because of the
inefficiencies and expense associated with launching large amounts of raw materials into
space."); see also Lewis & Lewis, supra note 25, at 746.
27 See Twibell, supra note 13, at 634 (explaining that a solar power satellite could collect
solar energy and beam it down to Earth at the cost of $60 billion and that "[i]n the future, as
the availability of resources declines or when Earth suffers a worldwide energy crisis, $60
billion may seem a more cost-effective investment").
28 See id. at 635 (explaining that Halley's Comet has a reserve of hydrocarbons as great
as that of the whole Earth, and can be relatively easily mined).
29 See id. at 636-37. Helium-3 is an isotope ideally suited for clean fusion power. The
problem has always been that there is simply too little of the resource here on Earth.
However, solar winds from the sun have deposited a large amount of the resource in the
Moon's substrate. Id.
30 The disposal of nuclear waste and other hazardous materials is especially suited for
ejection into space. See id at 631. This proposed resolution is not above reproach: after all,
just because it is "out of sight, out of mind" does not mean that the waste is really gone.
Outer space may seem infinite, but perhaps more thought is required before just throwing out
the garbage into what may someday become our own backyard.
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energy crisis and the hazardous waste problem could be of great social
benefit to all people of Earth, whether they are citizens of space-faring
States or not. Furthermore, an appropriate legal regime for the commercial
development of outer space could also level the playing field and enable
undeveloped States to compete with developed States, thereby promoting
the social benefit of equality for Earth-bound States.3 1
B. Why Private Commercial Space Enterprise: Cheaper and Egalitarian
Space has, however, offered the scientific, industrial, commercial and
social benefits discussed in Part II.A since the inception of the Space Age
five decades ago. The difference between then and now is that space
activity was once prohibitively expensive, so much so that only sovereign
superpowers could entertain such activities. NASA served well when the
only possible financier was the U.S. government, but now, space activity is
far more affordable, and innovative business models can be realistically
financed. Simply put, private commercial space enterprise can get the job
done just as well as national space agencies, but more efficiently. Private
commercial space enterprise also offers a uniquely egalitarian system by
which undeveloped nations may benefit from the exploration and use of
outer space as much as developed nations.
As discussed in Part I, private commercial space enterprise has
recently demonstrated that it is as capable as and arguably cheaper than
national space agencies when it comes to exploring and developing outer
space. SpaceShipOne, constructed in pursuit of the Ansari X-Prize, blasted
off into space with three people onboard and subsequently returned safely
twice in two weeks.3 2 Its financier, Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen,
financed the project with a mere $20 million-a far cry from the exorbitant
costs of a NASA project.
After the success of SpaceShipOne, its designer, Burt Rutan, joined
British billionaire entrepreneur Richard Branson to found Virgin Galactic,
the world's first space liner company.34 Virgin Galactic has already pre-
sold seats onboard future space liners to tour space at the relatively meager
sum of $200,000 per seat.35  Customers are already lining up-Virgin
Galactic has about 200 assured passengers, $30 million in deposits, and
about 85,000 registered interested customers.36 Impatient millionaires have
instead taken up offers from the Russian government, and have paid $20
31 See infra Part II.B.
32 See supra Part I.
33 Jonathan Thomas, Privatization of Space Ventures: Proposing a Proven Regulatory
Theory for Future Extraterrestrial Appropriation, I INT'L L. & MGMT. REv. 191, 191 (2005).
34 See id.
3s Id.





million to hitch rides on Russian Soyuz rockets on trips to the ISS. 3 7 These
tourist enterprises are financing human space travel by tapping into the
private market, a method never used by NASA. As Virgin Galactic and the
Russian government have demonstrated, the private market is a willing
financier for space enterprise if there is something to gain.
Perhaps in hopes of mirroring the private commercial success of the X-
Prize, American millionaire entrepreneur Robert Bigelow announced his
own $50 million contest entitled America's Space Prize.38 The Space Prize
is substantially more ambitious than the X-Prize. To win the Space Prize, a
team must construct and launch a space vehicle that can bring five persons
into orbit around the Earth, dock and service an inflatable private space
station, and return to Earth, twice in a given period.39 Bigelow's company,
Bigelow Aeronautics, purchased the technology and patent rights for the
inflatable space station from NASA because NASA did not have the
funding necessary to continue its research and development. 4 0  Already,
Bigelow Aerospace has successfully put two prototypes of the station,
named Genesis I and II, into the Earth's orbit.41 Bigelow Aerospace plans
to eventually use the final station for commercial purposes such as research,
tourism, and industrial production.42
NASA has recognized the success of these commercial private space
endeavors and joined the party, introducing its Centennial Challenges.43
However, the challenges sponsored by NASA are relatively modest,
generally featuring prizes under one million dollars." The major limitation
on the size of the prizes is government funding.4 5
Private commercial space enterprise is a more egalitarian model than
3 See Lewis & Lewis, supra note 25, at 745. Although the Russian space tourism
example may indicate that national space agencies can participate in the space tourist
industry, given the extraordinary discrepancy in cost to tour space between Virgin Galactic
and the Russian space agency, the example simply illustrates that there is a private market
willing to pay for access to space.
3 Tariq Malik, America's Space Prize: Reaching Higher Than Sub-Orbit, SPACE.coM,
Oct. 6, 2004,
http://www.space.com/businesstechnology/technology/spaceprize-techwed_041006.html.
39 Some of the details of the prize competition have yet to be worked out. Id.
40 Thomas, supra note 33, at 192.
41 Press Release, Bigelow Aerospace, Genesis II Calls Home (Jun. 28, 2007), available at
http://www.bigelowaerospace.com/news/?GenesisIICallsHome.
42 Thomas, supra note 33, at 192.
43 See NASA, Centennial Challenges, http://centennialchallenges.nasa.gov/index.htm
(last visited Nov. 1, 2009).
4 See id. The notable exceptions are the Lunar Lander Challenge (administered in
partnership with the X-Prize Foundation) and the Power Beaming and Tether Challenge,
each accompanied by a two million dollar purse.
45 See Brian Berger, Space Technology Prize Bill Stalls in the U.S. Senate, SPACE NEWS,
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national space agencies for exploring and developing space too. Private
commerce has enabled undeveloped countries to compete with the major
space-faring nations rather than depend on them. Also, while national
space agencies serve the interests of their own citizenry, private commercial
space enterprise can serve their shareholders, regardless of citizenry. Thus,
an undeveloped nation may employ an international space enterprise whose
shareholders are in part or in whole drawn from the citizenry of the nation.
For example, consider Chile, which established the Chilean Space
Agency ("CSA") in 2001. As recently as 2007, the CSA began entertaining
bids from international space companies regarding an Earth observation
satellite project.46 Normally, the CSA would have to politely request and
dutifully pay a space-faring State like the United States or Russia to
develop and launch a satellite into orbit. In addition to offending state
independence and sovereignty, those payments go into the pockets of the
taxpayers of the space-faring State. However, the CSA's use of an
international space company to implement its own space activities
highlights how a robust commercial regime could bolster participation in
space independent of the most developed space-faring States. Chile need
not request a space-faring State to implement their own space activities if it
can turn to a space company, and the payments to the space company could
ostensibly be enjoyed by Chilean citizens that are shareholders in the
international space company.
Despite the lucrative and beneficial reasons for further developing
outer space, and the demonstrated ability of the private sector to do so,
several hurdles face private commercial space enterprise-none
insurmountable. One potentially high hurdle is the legal structure
governing outer space.
III. SPACE LAW'S CURRENT STRUCTURE
A. Intemational Law, Generally
The legal structure for space law has its foundations in international
treaties. The grandfather of all international space law is the Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies ("Outer Space
Treaty"), 47 signed and ratified in 1967. Four other international treaties
from the 1960s and 1970s supplement the Outer Space Treaty: (1) the
46 See COMM. ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE, International Cooperation in the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Activities of Member States, % 4, 9, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/907/Add.2 (Mar. 13, 2008).
47 Opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter
OST], reprinted in United Nations Treaties and Principles on Outer Space, 3, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/722 (1999), available at http://www.1rt.mw.tum.de/documents/Referenzen/RF-
Politik/UNO/UNtreaties.pdf [hereinafter U.N. Treaties].
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Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched in Outer Space ("Rescue Treaty"); 48 (2) the
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects
("Liability Convention"); 49 (3) the Convention on Registration of Objects
Launched into Outer Space ("Registration Convention");50 and (4) the
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies ("Moon Treaty").
For the purpose of this comment, the Rescue Treaty is largely
irrelevant. However, the other international instruments are relevant. Part
III.B will discuss the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty together,
because they have important implications for property and ownership rights
in outer space. Part III.C will discuss the Liability Convention and
Registration Convention together, because they constitute a more specific
and actively used regulatory regime for outer space activities.
B. The Outer Space Treaty and Moon Treaty
First, it should be clarified why the Moon Treaty should be discussed
at all. Some commentators have simply dismissed the Moon Treaty as
irrelevant because it has been accepted by only a limited number of States.5
But, truly, it is only the lack of a major space-faring State from the number
of those States accepting the Moon Treaty that really motivates such
48 Opened for signature Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119, reprinted in
U.N. Treaties, supra note 47, at 8.
49 Opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter
Liability Convention], reprinted in U.N. Treaties, supra note 47, at 11.
50 Opened for signature Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter
Registration Convention], reprinted in U.N. Treaties, supra note 47, at 18.
5 Opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon Treaty],
reprinted in U.N. Treaties, supra note 47, at 22. Other international treaties and agreements
exist in addition to these five, but are tangential to this discussion of space
commercialization. Among those other space law agreements are: (1) the Convention on the
International Maritime Satellite Organization, opened for signature Sept. 3, 1976, 31 U.S.T.
1; and (2) the Agreement Among the Government of the United States of America,
Governments of Member States of the European Space Agency, The Government of Japan,
and the Government of Canada on Cooperation in the Detailed Design, Development,
Operation, and Utilization of the Permanently Manned Civil Space Station, Sept. 29, 1988,
State Dep't No. 92-65, 1992 WL 466295.
52 See, e.g., Twibell, supra note 13, at 597 (noting that as of January 1, 2008, only
thirteen States have ratified the Moon Treaty (Austria, Australia, Belgium, Chile,
Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines,
and Uruguay), and another four States have signed it (France, Guatemala, India, and
Romania)); see also U.N. OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS [UNOOSA], Comm. on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, United Nations Treaties and Principles on Outer Space and
Related General Assembly Resolution, Addendum, Status of International Agreements
Relating to Activities in Outer Space as at I January 2008, at 2, U.N. Doc.
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dismissals. If the United States, Russia, or China either signed or ratified
the Moon Treaty, surely those same commentators would think twice before
dismissing the Moon Treaty as irrelevant. However, even by that standard
of relevancy, the Moon Treaty is not permanently irrelevant. The company
of space-faring States is increasing in size, and the club of major space-
faring States is not as exclusive as it once was. Even among those few
States who ratified or signed the Moon Treaty, space-faring status is not
necessarily so far removed. India, one of the signatories to the Moon
Treaty, is aggressively developing its space-faring capabilities and there is
no reason to think it will not succeed sometime soon. After all, China
very quickly became a space-faring State once it similarly set out to develop
space-faring capabilities. 4 But even if the Moon Treaty is not specifically
relevant, the principles of the Moon Treaty reflect principles latent in the
Outer Space Treaty.
Collectively, the Outer Space Treaty and Moon Treaty promote a legal
regime seemingly inhospitable to the commercialization of outer space.
However, the two treaties do not prohibit the commercialization of outer
space outright. Rather, the two treaties resist private ownership and
appropriation, and even that resistance is not absolute. Ultimately, as will
soon become apparent, the two treaties do permit the private ownership and
appropriation necessary to commercialize space so long as international
interests are given their due consideration.
As a general observation, the Outer Space Treaty is steeped in the
rhetoric of a "common interest of all mankind," especially expressing the
concern that one part of "all mankind"-the less-developed States-will be
left out of the exploration and use of outer space while the other part of "all
mankind"-the developed States-will reap all the rewards of exploiting
outer space.55 Specifically, it declares that the exploration and use of outer
space is to be conducted "for the benefit and in the interests of all
countries ... and shall be the province of all mankind." 56 To that end, outer
space is to "be free for exploration and use by all States without
discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with
international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial
5 See Barboza, supra note 8.
54 See China Claims Its Place in Space, supra note 8.
5 The Outer Space Treaty opens by recognizing "the common interest of all mankind" in
exploring and using outer space for peaceful purposes, and stating "that the exploration and
use of outer space should be carried on for the benefit of all peoples irrespective of the
degree of their economic or scientific development." OST, supra note 47, opening
statements. Later, the Outer Space Treaty asserts that States are to "be guided by the
principle of cooperation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer
space [and on celestial bodies] with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other
States . . . ." Id. art. IX.
56 Id. art. I (emphasis added).
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bodies."s?
Given the notion of "free access," it is little surprise that neither outer
space nor celestial bodies are "subject to national appropriation."58
However, this does not directly address non-national appropriations, i.e.,
supra-national activities by the international community or sub-national
activities by individuals. As to sub-national activities, the signatory States
are required to "bear international responsibility for national activities in
outer space" and on celestial bodies, which includes activities conducted by
governmental entities, non-governmental entities, or both.59 If the activities
are conducted by non-governmental entities, then the apropriate State must
authorize and continuously supervise such activities. However, beyond
authorization and supervision, there is no indication as to what this
"responsibility" means for the extent of permitted sub-national
appropriation.
The Moon Treaty generally echoes the Outer Space Treaty,61 but is
also more extreme. While the Moon Treaty recognizes "the benefits which
may be derived from the exploitation of the natural resources of the Moon
and other celestial bodies," it protects those natural resources with rhetoric
more potent than a common "interest." To wit, the Moon Treaty declares
that those natural resources "are the common heritage of mankind." 63 Is a
"heritage" exploitable? If so, who can exploit it-"mankind?" How does
an ideal like "mankind" exploit resources? It would appear from the text of
the Moon Treaty that a "heritage" is exploitable only by "mankind" and that
"mankind" is roughly translated into "an international consensus." That is,
the Moon Treaty establishes a default rule generally prohibiting any
exploitation of the natural resources of any celestial bodies in the solar
system other than Earth," and then provides for two exceptions65 based on
5 Id.
ss Id. art. II. "Free access" is consistent with a prohibition of national appropriation.
"Free access" is later substantiated: "[a]ll stations, installations, equipment and space
vehicles on [celestial bodies] shall be open to representatives of other States . .. on a basis of
reciprocity." Id. art. XII.
" Id art. VI.
60 id
61 For example: (1) the Moon Treaty is "determined to promote on the basis of equality
the further development of cooperation among States in the exploration and use of...
celestial bodies," Moon Treaty, supra note 51, opening statements; (2) the Moon Treaty
states that "[t]he exploration and use of the Moon shall be the province of all mankind and
shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their
degree of economic or scientific development," id. art. 4, para. 1; (3) the Moon Treaty
emphasizes international cooperation "with due regard to the corresponding interests of all
other States," id art. 2; and (4) the Moon Treaty declares, "International cooperation in
pursuance of this Agreement should be as wide as possible ..... id art. 4, para. 2.
62 Id opening statements.
63 Id art. 11, para. 1.
6 First and foremost, the Moon cannot be subject to national appropriation. Id. art. 11,
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international consensus. First, celestial bodies in the solar system other
than Earth and the Moon are no longer subject to the restrictions of the
Moon Treaty if contrary "specific legal norms enter into force with respect
to any of these celestial bodies."6 6 Second, if an appropriate international
regime is created, then exploitation of the natural resources of celestial
bodies may proceed.
According to the Moon Treaty, an appropriate international regime for
regulating the exploitation of celestial natural resources need only fulfill
four purposes: (1) "the orderly and safe development of the natural
resources"; (2) "the rational management of those resources"; (3) "the
expansion of opportunities in the use of those resources"; and (4) "[a]n
equitable sharing" of the benefits of those resources giving "special
consideration" to the "interests and needs of the undeveloped countries" and
also "the efforts of those countries which have contributed either directly or
indirectly to the exploration of the Moon."6 8 That international regime is
supposed to be established "as such exploitation is about to become
feasible." 6 9
In synthesis, the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty do not
prohibit private property rights or forbid exploitation of natural resources in
space. The Outer Space Treaty only outright prohibits "national
appropriation," not supra- or sub-national appropriation, and requires that
outer space be explored and used to benefit the interests of "all mankind."
The notion of "free access" does not prohibit private property rights or
exploitation, either, because there is no indication of the specified level of
access-it could be free access to claim the property within an international
regime or free access for scientific investigation, or perhaps it means the
absence of a right to exclude. The first interpretation of "free access" is
perhaps best in light of the Moon Treaty, because that treaty openly
recognizes the benefits inherent in the exploitation of natural resources in
para. 2. Second, the Moon's surface, subsurface, and natural resources cannot become the
property of any State, entity, or person, whether international or national, private or public.
Id. art. 11, para. 3. Third, the provisions of the Moon Treaty apply to all celestial bodies in
the solar system other than Earth. Id. art. 1, para. 1. Together, these three sections create a
rule, but only a default rule because article 1, paragraph 1 and article 11, paragraph 3 can be
abridged.
65 A third exception is built into the Moon Treaty, too: States may "use mineral and other
substances of the Moon" to support scientific investigative missions. Id. art. 6, para. 2. This
exception does not rest on international consensus and instead suggests that any scientific
investigation is inherently compatible with, even a logical extension of, some notion of the
"mankind" authorized to appropriate from the "common heritage." Nevertheless, this is
largely irrelevant to a private commercial space enterprise that wishes to appropriate
property for profit, not scientific investigation.
66 Id. art. 1, para. 1.
67 Id art. 11, para 1.
6 Id art. 11, paras. 5-7.
69 Id. art. 11, para. 5.
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space and even desires such exploitation. Thus, the two treaties together
simply resist unilateral appropriation or exploitation. Instead, the two
treaties envision a regime, created by international consensus, which will
regulate such exploitation with due regard for the interests of not only
developed nations but also undeveloped nations.
C. The Liability Convention and Registration Convention
The Liability Convention and Registration Convention are different
from both the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty. First, the Outer
Space Treaty is a more general statement of principles governing outer
space activity. The Liability Convention and Registration Convention are
more topic-specific and detailed. Second, even though the Moon Treaty is
also topic-specific and detailed like the Liability Convention and
Registration Convention, the Moon Treaty is rarely applicable because the
use and exploitation of the Moon is not a regular activity. By contrast, the
Liability Convention and Registration Convention are regularly applicable70
because the potential for damage caused by space objects and the need to
register any space launch are regular activities, notably for the placement of
communication satellites in the Earth's orbit.
The Liability Convention and the Registration Convention also differ
from the Moon Treaty in another important respect: the Conventions are
effective regulations because they are content-specific and are each
accompanied by an authorized and duly established regime for
administering the rules promulgated by their respective provisions. For
example, the Liability Convention specifically holds States "absolutely
liable . . . for damage caused by its space object . . ."7 and provides that
claims regarding damage be presented through direct or indirect
"diplomatic channels" 72 within one year of the claimant's actual knowledge
70 While the Liability Convention has not yet been actually invoked, it was used to
threaten liability in the case of the Soviet Cosmos 954. See RENt LEFEBER,
TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL INTERFERENCE AND THE ORIGIN OF STATE LIABILITY
163-64 (1996) (explaining how Canada used the Liability Convention against Russia as a
threat). The threat of liability is, nevertheless, both a regular and an important issue. See
Report from the Aerospace Indus. Ass'n, Commercial Launch Liability Allocation of Risk,
available at http://www.aia-aerospace.org/assets/issue-commercial-launch.pdf (discussing
the need to extend U.S. government indemnification for commercial launch programs under
the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984). The Registration Convention is very clearly
regularly applied, though. According to Article II, whenever "a space object is launched into
Earth orbit or beyond, the launching State shall register the . .. object." Registration
Convention, supra note 50, art. II.
n' Liability Convention, supra note 49, art. II.
72 Id. art. IX. If diplomatic channels fail, then an alternative is provided for in the form
of a Claims Commission, composed of three members-one each selected by the two parties
and the third by mutual agreement. If the parties cannot mutually agree on the third choice,
either party may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to appoint the third
member. The Claims Commission then is to decide the merits of the claim and the
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of the damage." Similarly, the Registration Convention specifically
requires that a State register any space object launched by it "by means of
an entry in an appropriate registry which it shall maintain," 74 and report to
the Secretary-General of the United Nations certain basic information
regarding the space object, launch, and orbit.75  Furthermore, "[t]he
Secretary-General of the United Nations shall maintain a Register in which
the information furnished [by the launching States] shall be recorded."76
The Moon Treaty is relatively specific and accompanied by an authorized
regime for administrating its rules, but the authorized regime is neither
satisfactorily described nor duly established.
IV. WHAT THE CURRENT STRUCTURE OF SPACE LAW MEANS
FOR PRIVATE COMMERCIAL SPACE ENTERPRISE
A. What Private Commercial Space Enterprise Can and Cannot Do
The current structure of space law establishes some of the ground rules
for the participation of private commercial space enterprise. First, private
commercial space enterprise cannot be entirely selfish and ignore the
international community. International law clearly requires international
cooperation and consideration, especially with respect to undeveloped
States. This suggests that an international commercial space enterprise may
be better suited for space exploration and exploitation than a United States,
Russian, or other national commercial space enterprise. The only question
is whether the international activity envisioned by space law is public (i.e.,
a consortium of different national governments) or private (i.e., a
consortium of different national individuals) or both.
Second, private commercial space enterprise probably can appropriate
outer space and celestial bodies, but only in certain circumstances. While
the Outer Space Treaty generally prohibits such appropriation, that
prohibition is limited to "national" appropriation. Similarly, the Moon
Treaty, where applicable,77 prohibits appropriation unless executed
according to an international regime. The two treaties are policing not
against appropriation per se, but against unilateral appropriation contrary to
international interests.
appropriate compensation, if any. See id. arts. XIV-XX.
n Id. art. X.
74 Registration Convention, supra note 50, art. 11, para. 1.
7 Id. art. IV.
76 Id. art. II, para. 1.
n Of course, the Moon Treaty is not formally binding on the United States or other
nations that have neither signed nor ratified it, but it could become binding if the nation
eventually did sign and/or ratify it. For this comment, I have assumed that the Moon Treaty
could be relevant to more forcefully argue that even if signed and/or ratified by the United
States or other nations, it still would not prohibit private commercial appropriation.
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Third, and most importantly, private commercial space enterprise can
exploit the resources of the Moon, and eventually other celestial bodies in
the solar system, provided that the enterprise does so according to an
appropriately established international regime. The Moon Treaty permits
the exploitation of natural resources from the celestial bodies in our solar
system provided that an appropriate international regime governs the
process. For the Moon, the most important requirement of such a regime is
that there be an "equitable sharing" between developed active States and
undeveloped passive States. For other celestial bodies, there need only be
"specific legal norms" in place regarding the body. So long as an
international consensus is established, private commercial space enterprise
can indeed exploit the natural resources of the Moon and other celestial
bodies.
B. What Private Commercial Space Enterprise Needs
As argued above, private commercial space enterprise is not prevented
from participating in outer space activities or even from exploiting the
natural resources of outer space. However, private commercial space
enterprise has not exactly been given the keys to the Moon or any other
celestial body, either. What private commercial space enterprise needs to
effectively exploit outer space is for the international community to come
together and to establish an international regime to govern the exploitation
of outer space resources.
Such an international regime could take a number of different forms.
The important thing to recognize is that the "equitable sharing" required of
an international regime is not necessarily hostile to private
commercialization. As the Moon Treaty readily admits, "equitable sharing"
considers the interests of two parties: those who directly or indirectly
contribute to the exploitive activity and those who are unable to so.
Nothing in the language of the Moon Treaty requires that there be a half-
and-half split of any profit earned while exploiting outer space, nor any
other sort of mechanical division. While it is ultimately up to international
consensus to determine what sort of division is equitable, common sense
dictates that the vast majority of the profits go to the parties that invested
the time, risk, and money necessary to actually exploit outer space
resources. That all the profits do not go to the investing parties seems a
small price to exact to validate their authority to lay claim to those exploited
resources.
V. SUGGESTED REFORMS
Other commentators have recognized the need to open up space
exploration and exploitation to private commercial enterprise. While their
suggested reforms are generally laudable, some are more desirable than
others. The reforms least desirable are the ones that buck the clear intention
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of international law to prevent unilateral exploitation of outer space. Those
reforms misunderstand international law's tolerance for private
commercialization in outer space and ignore the possibility that the current
structure may accommodate private commercial space enterprise without
being bent or broken.
A potential barrier to private commercial space enterprise is the status
of property rights in outer space. The Outer Space Treaty and Moon Treaty
prohibit the establishment of any property rights regime in outer space
unless subjected to the theory of a "common heritage of mankind."
According to Ty S. Twibell, the inability to appropriate stifles
commercialization of outer space, because the lack of sovereignty means
too much uncertainty exists." The rationale is as follows: any uncertainty
of property ownership incapacitates private investors, because without the
guarantee that appropriated property or developed intellectual property is
their own to profit from or use, investors lack a motivation to participate in
space-related activities.79 Twibell is correct to identify uncertainty as a
disincentive to private commercialization, but his suggested reforms are
largely misguided because he interprets international law to effectively
prohibit exploitation. However, as argued in Part IV.A and IV.B,
international law considers exploitation desirable, and may permit private
commercial enterprises to do the work so long as this is done according to
an appropriate international regime.
Twibell suggests that the Outer Space Treaty requires amendments to
remove the non-appropriation language and the language of communal
property.so If that stalls, he suggests that the United States act unilaterally
"without the com8 lexity and difficulties of passing new or amended
international law." These are unnecessary reforms that ignore established
international law, some of which the United States is legally bound to.
International consensus should also not be ignored if the United States
wishes for any validation of its authority in outer space. Twibell does make
a third suggestion, however, which is more useful: applying the laws of
offshore drilling to outer space mining could encourage private companies
to begin mining operations.82 Claims for particular mining interests, once
identified, would be enforceable in the international community according
to the principles of reciprocity, and those claims would be strictly limited to
the nearby area around the mining facilities.83 This resembles the sort of
78 Twibell, supra note 13, at 591 ("International space law and domestic law following it,
prohibit appropriation of celestial property. It is this prohibition and the uncertainty in the
limited property rights that stifle the commercialization and industrialization of outer
space.").
7 Id. at 616.
so Id. at 638.





international regime envisioned generally in the Outer Space Treaty and
specifically in the Moon Treaty.
Twibell is not the only commentator concerned about the restrictions
imposed on private commercial enterprise by the "common heritage of
mankind" doctrine implicit in the Outer Space Treaty and explicit in the
Moon Treaty. William Lee Andrews, III fears that the lack of private
property in space could deter space settlers because at any time "earth-
bound governments could determine that the settlement would better
'benefit all mankind' through some other use."84 Jonathan Thomas has also
roundly criticized the notion of a "common heritage of mankind," noting
that States who spent the time and resources to explore and appropriate
outer space resources would have to compensate States that spent nothing.
However, the Andrews criticism presupposes that the language of
"benefit all mankind" is completely open-ended, but international law
actually envisions "all mankind" to be a consensus of sorts, and there is no
reason to think that any spacefarers will be excluded from the consensus of
"all mankind." 8 6 The Thomas criticism presupposes that an "equitable
sharing" of outer space profits with non-contributing party is inconsistent
with any conception of equity. However, equity is a broad concept that
could and should embrace more than just the results of participation in outer
space activities-it can and should encompass the reasons for not
participating in outer space activities. It would not be unreasonable for the
international community to conclude that an "equitable sharing" of outer
space profits with non-participating parties, particularly non-developed
nations, should amount to a nominal share. Besides, developed contributing
parties would be receiving something valuable in return for sharing nominal
profits-validation of their authority to exploit outer space.
Of course, no international regime has yet been composed to determine
exactly what constitutes "equitable sharing." Such a regime should be
created.
84 William Lee Andrews, III, A Mighty Stone for David's Sling: The International Space
Company, 1 REGENT J. INT'L L. 5, 26-27 (2003) ("[I]n outer space, unless a corpus juris
spatialis changes, future colonists will never have traditional property rights and much like
our ancestral American colonists, will be faced with taxation without representation.").
85 Thomas, Privatization of Space Ventures, supra note 33, at 202 ("[R]egardless of the
individual contributions of a State to the establishment of space exploration or celestial
appropriation, under the Moon Treaty a noncontributing State will receive a benefit and an
interest."). For a skeptical critique of the realizability of a "common heritage of mankind,"
see id. at 207 ("While there is little past precedent to justify it, and little present sentiment to
support it, the current corpus juris spatialis clings to the idea that in the future, humans will
be able to share the resources of space in common.").
86 Whether such spacefarers might be under-represented rather than excluded in the
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VI. A REFORM CONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN
INTERNATIONALLY AUTHORIZED SPACE DISTRICT
The international community should soon establish an appropriate
international regime to govern the exploitation of outer space resources.
Private commercial space enterprise is poised to explore, use, and develop
outer space, the Moon, and other celestial bodies in our solar system, and
private commercial space enterprise should be given the green light to do
so-for their own profit and for the benefit of all mankind. That exploitive
activity is only authorized if an appropriately established international
regime governs the process, something that is not yet in place. Thus,
because private commercial space enterprise is poised to and should exploit
outer space, an international regime should be established.
The important question is: "What sort of regime is desirable and is that
regime possible?" To answer this, it is appropriate to begin with what the
regime must do. It must (1) appeal to international consensus ("all
mankind"); and (2) encourage private commercial space enterprise. The
regime could come in many different sorts varying in degree from the
rhetorical to the material. On the rhetorical extreme, the regime could be a
document-either a constitution or a detailed treaty-that establishes what
sort of exploitation may be done by whom in which places according to
what processes for establishing claims, profits, and equitable sharing. On
the material extreme, the regime could be instituted by a living
organization, composed of elected or appointed administrators, with the
resources necessary to such governance at hand-chief and foremost, a
judicial or arbitration facility.
Either sort of regime could be agreed upon by international consensus,
and in fact in the past, both have been the subject of international
consensus. The Moon Treaty itself is heavier on rhetoric, because it is
totally absent of any administrative regime. The Liability Convention and
Registration Convention, by contrast, are heavier on material, being
accompanied by complete administrative regimes. Here, the material sort
would better encourage private commercial space enterprise because the
exploitation of outer space will require a flexible and responsive regime to
accommodate the enterprises' developing needs. If a rhetorical regime
were drafted, the Moon Treaty would perpetuate its own shortcomings. It
would be unresponsive to developing needs and would require further
amendment, elaboration, or interpretation to respond to private commercial
space enterprise's needs as they come up.
In the hope of encouraging discussion about what kind of material
regime would best consider international interests while freely encouraging
private commercial exploitation of outer space resources, I now suggest a
skeleton for a potential international regime. Rather than settling for
drafting another principled document, the international community could
establish a more concrete, material regime in the form of a physical space
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district. This space district would be independent of any particular State
sovereignty, instead of being dependent on an international consensus.
Because the implementation of such a space district would be completely
novel and its implications potentially far-ranging, the mere idea of such an
international regime is indeed delicate. Notwithstanding those delicacies,
an independent, international space district could potentially resolve the
conflicts between developed space-faring States and undeveloped Earth-
bound States and between public sovereigns and private enterprise.
A space district, to be of any use, would first have to appeal to the
international community. Developed space-faring States may resent the
fact that the authority for exploiting outer space resources is subject to the
discretions of undeveloped Earth-bound States, that their unique "right" to
exploit, created and paid for by commitments to economic, scientific, and
technological development, could be reduced to a "privilege" by those who
have not made and paid for such commitments. Undeveloped Earth-bound
States, on the other hand, may find it appealing that the developed space-
faring States are so restricted from unilaterally exploiting space to their own
advantage. The key to making the space district appeal to all sides is to
establish the space district in a manner of sovereign neutrality.
Sovereign neutrality may perhaps be accomplished by having an
international administration independent of particular sovereigns' influence
govern the space district. That administration could perhaps be composed
of a governance board of representatives of which half is appointed by
certain member States of the United Nations and half is elected by all the
member States. Or perhaps neutrality could be ensured by distinguishing
participation in the space district by a certain kind of citizenship. That
citizenship could resemble a sort of first "international citizenship," which
could be either inclusive (a citizenship that can be maintained in addition to
one's own original citizenship[s]) or exclusive (a citizenship that can be
maintained only in alternative to one's own original citizenship[s]). That
citizenship need not be structured as "international" either, if such an
extension of citizenship is too novel and dramatic for too many national
sovereigns. Less dramatic, although still novel in its own respect, would be
to construct the citizenship as an altogether new citizenship independent of
any other. That is, the international community would not be creating an
international entity, but instead a new national entity created by the
international community. After all, no rule states that a new nation can only
be created by rebellion and secession-why not the peaceful creation of a
nation, whose creation benefits all mankind? I will term this sort of
"nation" as neither international nor exactly national, but instead supra-
87 The politics of where such a space district would be established is indeed itself a high
hurdle. However, if an international consensus is really a valuable and practical method for
decision-making, then through this method the international community could eventually
settle on a location for a space district that appeals to as many States as possible.
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national.
How a space district could benefit all mankind is an important issue to
address too. After all, to comply with the principles inherent in the Outer
Space Treaty and Moon Treaty, this space district must "equitably share"
whatever profits or benefits exploitation of outer space produces. Whether
the space district is structured as international or supra-national, it must
maintain some sort of relationship with "all mankind." Particularly if the
space district is structured as an international entity, the simplest way to
relate the space district to the international community would be by taxes.
The proceeds of a space-district-targeted tax would be subject to
distribution in the international community with due regard for each
sovereign's involvement in space exploitation and also the inability to be so
involved.
If the space district is structured as a supra-national entity, the simplest
way to relate the space district to the international community would be by
corporate distributions.88  That may be best affected by, in addition to
offering a unique brand of citizenship, offering companies a unique brand
of incorporation. The benefits and profits of exploiting outer space could
be purposefully funneled through international space corporations
authorized to operate in the space district. As long as shareholding status is
freely open to all citizens of the world-or if only to citizens of the space
district, as long as the space district's citizenship is open to all the world-
the citizens of any country, developed or undeveloped, would be freely able
to invest in the exploitation of space and equitably receive a share of the
returns.
In addition to being internationally appealing, a space district must
also effectively encourage private commercial space enterprises to exploit
outer space. Perhaps, most dramatically, the space district could be given
exclusive rights to exploit the resources of outer space. Private commercial
space enterprise would then necessarily flock to the space district to operate
rather than in their national contexts, provided the space district regulated
space enterprise as effectively as sovereign States.
A space district would also have benefits inherent in physical
consolidation that could encourage private commercial space enterprise.
Specifically, the infrastructure and governance of all aspects of the space
industry could be consolidated. Satellites and space vehicles could be
constructed, tested and evaluated, launched, tracked, and returned in the
same location. And the governing regulatory authority could be there
through the entire development, launch, and return process to ensure
compliance.
But why would all space enterprise, private or otherwise, want to
88 Taxes would not be appropriate here, as an international tax on a single targeted
sovereign would hardly seem to advance international equality-it favors one sovereign at
the cost of another's oppressive subjugation.
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operate in a space district? Perhaps a very powerful reason would be tax
incentives. If companies and individuals living and operating in the space
district were tax-favored, perhaps even tax-free, the space district could
essentially serve as a space industry incubator-it would be a creative
extension of zoning laws to incentivize a certain sort of development.
While these are all merely suggestions, they aptly demonstrate how the
structure of a space district could be very flexibly adapted to address the
concerns of a diverse international community as well as of the private
commercial community. It is my hope that the concept of a space district
spurs the development of an international regime to govern the private
commercial exploitation of outer space. We can all benefit from this.
VII. CONCLUSION
Commercial participation in the space industry has recast the Space
Race, once a public and national endeavor, as a private and commercial
endeavor. Private commercial space enterprise is poised to cheaply, and
ostensibly fairly, exploit many natural resources of outer space. Such
exploitation is desirable because of the potential benefits exploitation would
have for science, industry, commerce, and society. But international law
does not encourage private commercial space enterprise to exploit outer
space. However, international law does not prohibit exploitation. Instead,
international law requires an international regime to be established to
govern the process of exploitation, particularly to oversee the "equitable
sharing" of the benefits. Other commentators have suggested major
revision or abandonment of international law. But this would undermine
international law, an unnecessary and undesirable result. Instead, an
international regime can and should be established. A space district could
potentially resolve many of the important problems confronting the
establishment of such a regime.
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